Why International Law Favors Emigration Over Immigration by Kleven, Thomas
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
4-1-2002
Why International Law Favors Emigration Over
Immigration
Thomas Kleven
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Kleven, Why International Law Favors Emigration Over Immigration, 33 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 69 (2002)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol33/iss1/3
ARTICLE
WHY INTERNATIONAL LAW FAVORS
EMIGRATION OVER IMMIGRATION
BY THOMAS KLEVEN*
1. Introduction ......................................... 70
II. International Law Regarding Freedom of
M ovem ent ........................................... 70
III. Freedom of Movement and Liberal Idealism ......... 74
IV. An Historical-Materialist Analysis of International
Practice ............................................. 83
V. The Freedom of Movement Under Socialism ......... 93
VI. Conclusion: Where to From Here .................... 98
* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University. An earlier version of this article was presented at the International
Conference of Democratic Jurists held in October 2000 in Havana, Cuba.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1
I. INTRODUCTION
The norms of international law currently support the right of
people to freely emigrate from their home country more than the
right to freely immigrate to a country where they prefer to live.
This paper examines the reasons and justification for this
divergence.
The question is first addressed from the vantage point of lib-
eral idealism, which now dominates international law, and then
from a historical-materialist perspective. It turns out that it is
hard to reconcile the existing regime with liberal principles and
that historical-materialism better explains what is going on,
namely, that the existing regime favors the interests of the richer
and more powerful capitalist nations that now dominate the world
and contributes to the growing inequalities among the nations
and people of the world.
The primary opposition to the existing regime, in particular to
the principle of free emigration, came from the Soviet bloc. That
effort was unsuccessful, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union
the existing regime of free emigration and controlled immigration
has become entrenched. If, however, the trend of increasing
worldwide inequality should persist, a more democratic form of
socialism may well emerge as a viable alternative to the current
world order. Accordingly, the last two sections of the paper specu-
late briefly on how freedom of movement might be handled under
democratic socialism, and on the possibility of reforming the
existing regime and of moving in a socialist direction.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
A fundamental ideal underlying liberalism is that of self-
determination.' Self-determination operates on two levels: an
individual level where each person has the right to pursue one's
own destiny within a sphere of personal autonomy; and a collec-
tive level where groups of people, ranging in size from small com-
munities to nation-states to perhaps one day a world government,
have the right to govern themselves democratically.2 Since indi-
vidual and collective self-determination overlap, neither can be
1. See generally NORBERTO BOBBio, LIBERALISM & DEMOCRACY 5-9, 15-19, 37-44
(Verso 1990); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 83-118 (Yale University
Press 1989).
2. Id.
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absolute and liberal societies must strive somehow to strike a
proper balance between the two.
3
The impact of liberal ideology on international law can be
seen in its approach to the question of freedom of movement.
With regard to immigration, collective self-determination
prevails. The right of nations to regulate immigration is implicit
in the United Nations Charter, which acknowledges the sovereign
right of all nations to self-determination with regard to domestic
matters.' Only when a country does things that threaten the
peace or other nations may the international community inter-
vene in its internal affairs.'
In theory this qualification on the right of sovereignty might
justify substantial international control over nations' immigration
policies. In practice, nations are substantially free to regulate
immigration as they see fit with two major exceptions. One is the
requirement in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("International Covenant") of some due process of law
before a country may expel a lawfully admitted alien.' Second, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration")
provides that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum
from persecution in other countries.7
The Universal Declaration could be interpreted to require
countries to admit persecuted people as lawful immigrants. Thus
far, international practice, as set forth in the U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, has been to grant refugees not
the right to be lawfully admitted anywhere, but only the right if
one can get to another country not to be expelled or returned to
where one's life or freedom would be threatened.'
With regard to emigration, on the other hand, individual self-
determination prevails. Both the Universal Declaration and the
International Covenant, the most basic statements of interna-
tional norms regarding individual rights, expressly declare every-
one's right to freedom of movement within their countries as well
3. Id.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1,7.
5. Id. at para. 3,4.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 2000A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21't Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)[hereinafter
ICCPRI.
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
8. U.N. Convention, Articles 31-33, Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted
on July 28, 1951 and entered into force on April 25, 1954.
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as the right to leave and return to their countries.9 Both docu-
ments do countenance some, although limited, collective restric-
tions on the right to leave. A general provision of the Universal
Declaration allows limitations on the rights it sets forth only in
order to protect "the rights and freedoms of others" and in the
interest of "morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society."" And the International Covenant expressly
prohibits restrictions on the right to leave except "when necessary
to protect national security, public order/ordre public, public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others."1
These terms are susceptible to both expansive and narrow
readings, and have been the subject of some debate particularly
during the 1970's and 1980's.2 The dominant view now, greatly
influenced by Western participants in the debate, is that they are
to be strictly construed and that the freedom to leave is to be
treated as a preferred right not to be too readily or overly
9. UDHR, supra note 7, at art. 13; ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 12(1)&(2). The
United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, and 144 of the world's 190 or so nations
have now ratified it. On the liberal underpinnings of the UDHR and ICCPR, both of
which drew heavily on the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and on Western liberal
philosophy generally, see THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS - THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-31 (Louis Henkin ed., Columbia University Press
1981). Whether standing alone the UDHR has the force of law is a complex question
that depends on what it takes for something to acquire the status of international
law. The UDHR states that it is "a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations," and does not expressly require states to observe it. Id. at 9; UDHR,
supra note 7, at Preamble. The operative law, which does so require of its signatories,
is the ICCPR. Several subsequent international agreements adopted between the
mid-1960s and early 1980s also incorporate the right to leave: the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights. For a history, see HURST HANNII, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 3-16 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987).
10. UDHR, supra note 7, at art. 29.
11. ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 12.3.
12. See HANNum, supra note 9, at 19-46; Alexander Charles Kiss, Permissible
Limitations on Rights, as printed in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS - THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 290. Under U.S. law the
term "general welfare," which is used in the UDHR, has a very broad meaning that
might allow the freedom to leave to be restricted for a wide variety of reasons
pursuant to a rational basis test according it no special protection. Perhaps for this
reason a general welfare exception was expressly rejected in drafting the ICCPR, the
operative law, in favor of the "public order/ordre public" terminology, which has
somewhat narrower overtones in English (akin perhaps to prevention of disorder)
than in French where it invokes not only the welfare of the public but also the
protection of individual human rights that "cannot be lightly sacrificed even for the
good of the majority or the common good of all." Id. at 302.
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infringed. 3 And, in fact, emigration does tend in practice to be far
freer than immigration, which is highly controlled by most coun-
tries, 4 and most countries in the world now have relatively free
emigration policies and practices. 5
In sum, international law favors the right to emigrate over
13. See THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS - THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 26 (stating that "[alnother general principle,
particularly relevant to the Covenant, is that 'limitations clauses' - provisions
permitting derogation on rights - shall be strictly and narrowly construed."); Stig
Jagerskiold, The Freedom of Movement, as printed in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS - THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 166,178
(arguing that "[tihere must be a clear threat to a vital state interest in order to justify
restricting this right [i.e., the freedom to leave]."); Upsala (Sweden) Colloquium,
Declaration on the Right to Leave and the Right to Return (1972) (declaring that "[a]
person's right to leave a country shall be subject only to such reasonable limitations
as are necessary to prevent a clear and present danger to the national security or
public order."); American Association for the International Commission of Jurists,
The Siracusa Principles on Limitation and Derogation Provisions (1984) (declaring
that "[aill limitation clauses shall be interpreted strictly and in favor of the rights at
issue").
14. See International Migration Policies and Programmes: A World Survey (U.N.,
1982)(on file with author).
15. See ALAN DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS - THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (Yale University Press 1987) (regarding a history of nations'
emigration practices). See also Hannum, supra note 9, at 71-117. As of the late 1980s
Dowty concluded that "never before have states so effectively controlled the right of
their citizens to leave or stay". ALAN DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS - THE CONTEMPORARY
ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, at 3. While Dowty detailed widespread
restrictions on emigration, he overstated his case somewhat, particularly relative to
restraints on immigration. Perhaps this is because he views the right to emigrate,
which he refers to as "the last refuge of liberty," id. at 7, as more important than the
right to immigrate, which regard to which he argues that "surely a state may regulate
the entry of newcomers." Id. at 5. As the next section of this paper shows, this
distinction is highly questionable from a theoretical perspective. Dowty identified
fifty-seven nations that restricted emigration in varying degrees (twenty-one tightly,
fourteen partially, and twenty-two occasionally). Id. at 185-87. The United States is
curiously absent from the list despite the travel ban to Cuba. This means that almost
two-thirds of the 150 or so nations then existing had relatively free emigration
practices, unlike immigration which was almost universally restricted. Thus
Hannum, writing at the same time, concluded that "[although] the right to leave and
return is violated in many parts of the world.., this should not obscure the fact that a
majority of countries do respect the right in a meaningful way ..... HNM, supra
note 9, at 124-125. According to Hannun, the right to leave was "essentially
unhindered" in the entire Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, many African
states, and in most of the developed and many of the smallest developing countries in
Asia and the Pacific. Id. And even more so now, especially as a result of the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, which were among the most restrictive
countries. Of the twenty-one nations Dowty identified as tightly restricting
emigration, eight now allow substantially free emigration and several others have
substantially reduced their restrictions. See U.S. Dep't. of State, 1999 Country Rpts.
on Hum. Rts. Prac. (A perusal of the Country Reports shows that most countries now
allow relatively free emigration).
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the right to immigrate. The freedom to emigrate is treated as an
individual right of high priority, a right that nations are not to
override without good reason. On the other hand, with the limited
exceptions noted, the ability to immigrate is subject to nations'
discretion, pursuant to their sovereign right of self-determination,
to admit to their territories only those that they see fit. But does
this dichotomy square with the liberal ideology underlying inter-
national law?
III. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND LIBERAL IDEALISM
From the vantage point of liberal idealism, the issue of free-
dom of movement poses a conflict between notions of individual
rights and of community. As an individual right, the right to
travel, to freely move about, to settle where one pleases, would
seem as fundamental to self-determination as many other individ-
ual rights such as free speech and freedom of religion." While lib-
eral thinkers may differ as to the exact source of these rights, they
are widely accepted in philosophies that view individual rights as
morally required. 7
Individual rights, however, are rarely viewed as absolute.
Reasonable limitations are deemed acceptable in order to prevent
the exercise of individual rights from injuring others or the collec-
tive welfare of society as a whole. Regarding free speech, for
example, such reasoning underlies libel laws or restraints against
16. Within the United States, for example, the right to travel has long been
recognized as a fundamental constitutional right, embracing people's individual
freedom to leave, enter and settle in the various states and their right not to be
treated in ways that undermine the right to travel. See Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating statute prohibiting the transport of indigents into the
state); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating statutes denying
welfare assistance to residents of less than one year); Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.Ct. 1518
(1999) (invalidating statute limiting welfare benefits during first year of residency).
But see infra, note 83. And as noted above, international law also protects people's
right to freedom of movement within their countries, although not the freedom to
enter other countries. See cites at note 9, supra, and accompanying text.
17. For other philosophical discussions of the freedom of movement, see Joseph H.
Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REv. OF POL. 251 (1987);
Timothy King, Immigration From Developing Countries: Some Philosophical Issues,
93 ETHICS 525 (1983); JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION (Warren F. Schwartz, ed., Cambridge
University Press 1995); Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, printed in
BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS at 1 (Peter G. Brown & Henry
Shue, eds., Rowman and Littlefield 1981); Frederick G. Whelan, Citizenship and
Freedom of Movement: An Open Admission Policy?, as printed in OPEN BORDERS?
CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 1 (Mark Gibney, ed.,
Greenwood Press 1988); R. George Wright, Federal Immigration Law and the Case for
Open Entry, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1265 (1994).
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divulging state secrets.1" And regarding free exercise of religion
such reasoning underlies punishing religious acts that constitute
child abuse or contribute to social problems such as drug abuse.19
Similar reasoning has justified restraints on the individual
freedom of movement."0 As regards immigration the principle of
sovereignty now grants nations substantial, indeed almost com-
plete, discretion to control who may enter their territories and
obtain the benefits of citizenship. Sovereignty derives from the
right of people to collective self-determination. But the individual
claim to be able to freely immigrate also entails an assertion of the
right of self-determination. This begs the question of why the
right of collective self-determination should outweigh that of indi-
vidual self-determination in the immigration context.2 '
On the other hand, international norms now support the right
to freely emigrate in the name of individual self-determination.
Nevertheless, it could be asserted that the right of collective self-
determination and the principle of sovereignty justify a nation's
discretion to control emigration to the same extent as immigra-
tion. This begs the questions of why the right of individual self-
determination should outweigh that of collective self-determina-
tion regarding emigration and of why the two contexts, immigra-
tion and emigration, should be treated differently with respect to
18. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (holding First Amendment
does not protect magazine's publication of false report regarding non-public figure);
United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 990 (W.D.Wis. 1979)(enjoining
publication of article explaining technical process of designing and operating
thermonuclear weapons on grounds of likely endangerment of national security).
19. See Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding
child labor laws override parental prerogatives); Employment Division v. Smith, 496
U.S. 913 (1990) (holding free exercise clause does not protect ceremonial use of peyote
by Native Americans from application of drug laws).
20. For example, protecting national security has been recognized, even by
supporters of the right of free movement, as justifying reasonable restrictions on
emigration or foreign travel in appropriate circumstances. See Jagerskiold, supra
note 13, at 178 (justifying restraints on emigration and travel in the case of military
personnel on active duty, persons subject to not yet completed mandatory national
service, or strong reason to believe someone will engage in activities harmful to
country).
21. Many of the same considerations that underlie the right to freely move about
within a country, as protected both by international and domestic law, see sources
cited supra notes 9 & 16, could be advanced in support of an international right to
immigrate. This begs the question of why sovereignty overrides individual self-
determination in the latter context, while collective self-determination is subordinate
domestically to the right to travel. Is it because the two situations really differ from
an ethical perspective, or is the explanation more one of power politics in that nation-
states are unwilling to compromise this aspect of their sovereignty for reasons of self-
interest?
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the balance as between individual and collective self-
determination.
As for immigration, collective self-determination might
arguably outweigh individual self-determination on the ground
that uncontrolled immigration could threaten the well-being of a
nation's people. Uncontrolled immigration might, for example,
impoverish a nation with insufficient resources to support the
newcomers. But it is hard to justify an unfettered right to control
immigration through such a utilitarian argument, since the well-
being of those excluded from entering a nation is also relevant to a
utilitarian calculation and may at times outweigh the impact on a
nation's current residents.2 Suppose, for example, that impover-
ished people want to move from a poor to a rich country in order to
improve their economic circumstances.23 Surely the benefits to the
immigrants would often outweigh whatever detriments might
result to the receiving country. Yet current international norms
grant nations total discretion regarding immigration in such
instances and do not require of them a utilitarian calculation. 4
Conversely, it is hard to justify on utilitarian grounds an
absolute freedom to emigrate. At times the benefits to those who
leave a country may outweigh the detriments of their leaving to
those who remain. But uncontrolled emigration could also
threaten the well-being of a nation, and such harms might at
times outweigh the interests of those wanting to leave. Suppose,
for example, that relatively well-educated and highly skilled peo-
ple want to leave underdeveloped countries that have provided
them training and need their services in order to prosper. Surely,
22. This may help explain the limited protection international law accords
someone who flees another country to escape persecution. From a utilitarian vantage
point it might be thought that persecution so undermines a person's well-being that
the impact of not being able to deport someone, or even of having to lawfully admit
them, would rarely if ever be more detrimental to a nation's well-being than the
benefits to the persecuted.
23. I shall assume here that economic circumstances do not constitute
persecution, although the point could be debated and the contention becomes quite
strong under conditions of extreme economic hardship.
24. Nor would it suffice to mandate such because a nation's decision-makers, who
may favor the interests of insiders for reasons of affinity or political accountability,
are not in a position to fairly weigh the interests of outsiders. If a utilitarian
calculation is to govern the right of nations to exclude, then considerations of
procedural fairness would seem to require that the decision be made more
democratically: either by disinterested parties, or in some forum where the interests
of both insiders and outsiders are fairly represented, or at least subject to the
oversight of an international body with the power to override a nation's initial
decision to exclude someone.
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a utilitarian calculation would often support some collective
restraints on emigration in such instances. Yet current interna-
tional norms elevate the right to emigrate to a preferred status
that protects it to a great degree from such utilitarian trade-offs."
This treatment is much like the way in which a bill of rights insu-
lates protected rights from politics by requiring a compelling state
interest in order to regulate them.
This analysis suggests that the international norms protect-
ing both the individual freedom to emigrate and nations' discre-
tion to control immigration derive from other than a utilitarian
rationale.26 And that for some reason in the emigration context,
the individual right to freely move about trumps the sovereign
right of national self-determination as a matter of principle, and
vice versa as regards immigration. It is difficult, however, to
fathom what those reasons might be.
Certainly, it seems far from clear that egalitarian approaches
such as Rawls' would resolve the immigration and emigration
issues in this manner.27 What would hypothetical rational people
operating behind a veil of ignorance and knowing that they might
turn out to be one of the several billion impoverished people at the
beginning of the 21St century agree to? Rawls posits that they
would agree that "each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others" (the liberty principle), and that "social and economic ine-
qualities are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged" (the difference principle). 8
At this point in history, granting nations the blanket right to
exclude others except in the case of persecution seems incompati-
ble with these principles. It may be that one of the liberties
encompassed within the liberty principle is the right of people to
control a certain territory within which to autonomously pursue
cultural identity and economic opportunity, and even to restrict
the entry of others in order to protect that right. But if so, then
the liberty principle would also seem to require that sufficient
comparable territory be available to afford others that same right.
The United States, for example, has a disproportionate per
25. See sources cited at notes 9-13, supra, and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press 1971).
28. Id. at 60,83.
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capita share of the world's wealth and resources; 9 and there is
ample room in the United States for others who lack comparable
opportunities elsewhere to pursue their destinies in at least a rel-
atively autonomous manner, either within an overarching nation
state or by splitting up the country into smaller nations. In this
context, the sovereign right of the United States to totally exclude
outsiders would privilege its self-determination over others,
thereby contravening the requirement of equal liberty. Only if the
self-determination claims of outsiders who want admission into
the United States were to threaten to overwhelm the self-determi-
nation of those already occupying that territory would the asser-
tion of sovereignty be compatible with the liberty principle.
Now in fact the United States does permit substantial num-
bers of people to immigrate. Hence, it might be argued that the
United States does not use its sovereign right to exclude in viola-
tion of the liberty principle, but rather that it is controlling the
pace of immigration in order to fairly balance the liberty interests
of insiders and outsiders. As discussed below, however, the
United States' immigration policy would seem hard to rationalize
as fairly balanced. Notable, for example, are the past and argua-
bly continuing preference accorded to whites over non-whites,31 as
well as the preferences currently accorded to the well-educated
and highly skilled over the less well off." Such preferences seem
incompatible with the equality of rights that the liberty principle
requires. Instead, these preferences would seem to exacerbate the
social and economic inequalities that already exist in the world,3
thereby violating the difference principle as well.
29. As of 1997 the per capita Gross Domestic Product in the United States was
about six times that of that world as a whole, up from closer to five times world GDP
twenty years earlier. Human Development Report 1999 151-54 publication of the U.N.
Dev. Prog. available at http'J/www.undp.org/hdro/report.html#stats. (last visited Jan.
14, 2002). The United States, which has about four and a half percent of the world's
population, has about six percent of the total land area and twelve percent of the
arable land, consumes about twenty-five percent of the world's energy (coal,
petroleum, natural gas and electricity), and produces about twenty percent of the
world's grain (wheat, corn and rice). THE TIME ALMANAC 2000 53, 329, 571-73 (Time,
Inc); 1998 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 187 (Houghton Mifflin).
30. See infra notes 50-51, and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 58, and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 62-63, and accompanying text.
33. On the growing disparities between richer and poorer nations, see Giovanni
Arrighi, World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism, 189 NEw LEFT REV.
39 (1991); Human Development Report 1999, supra note 29, at 2-3 (reporting that a
fifth of the world's population living in the richest countries had 86% of the world
GDP as against 1% for the bottom fifth, and that the income gap between the top and
bottom fifths rose from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 74 to 1 in 1997).
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Nor would the liberty and difference principles seem to
require as extensive a freedom to emigrate as under current inter-
national norms. As noted below, most emigration is from the less
developed to the richer capitalist nations. Much of this emigration
drains from the less developed societies the people most able to
contribute to their development, again exacerbating the tremen-
dous inequalities that exist in the world.34
Moreover, much emigration results from actions on the part of
the richer nations that undercut the ability of people elsewhere to
freely pursue their destinies. For example, many immigrants to
the United States come from countries devastated by U.S. mili-
tary and political intervention.35 Also much emigration is a by-
product of colonialism, a clear-cut violation of the liberty and dif-
ference principles, which persisted over a period of several centu-
ries and arguably continues today in altered form."
34. There is ample evidence of substantial brain drain of highly skilled people
from developing countries and of an increase in this phenomenon since the mid-1960s,
especially to the United States, Europe, Australia, and Canada. See, e.g., THE IMPACT
OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19-36 (Reginald Appleyard,
ed., Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Development Co-operation
and Development 1989); Chen Chin Long, The Immigration Policies of Developed
Countries and the "Brain Drain"from Developing Countries, as printed in THE IMPACT
OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 213; DowTy, supra note
15, at 147-53, 157-58. This fact does not disturb those economists who advocate a free
market in labor as a means to optimize the value of labor. Yet not only may an
unregulated labor market produce undesirable social costs, it may also contribute to
the enrichment of the richer countries at the expense of the poor. How much brain
drain actually hurts developing countries is a complex question that depends on a
comparison of harms (e.g., loss of productivity, family disruption) versus benefits (e.g.,
reduced public service needs, remittances from workers abroad), many of which are
difficult to identify and quantify, and the answer may differ depending on the
circumstances. See Charles W. Stahl, Overview: Economic Perspectives, as printed in
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 361. Many
believe the harm to be substantial, and the growing disparities between developed
and developing countries seem to bear that out. See e.g., D. Chongo Mundende, The
Brain Drain and Developing Countries, as printed in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 183; STANISLAV SIMANOVSKY, MARGARITA P.
STREPETOVA & YURIY G. NAIDO, "BRAIN DRAIN" FROM RUSSIA: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS,
WAYS OF REGULATION (Nova Science Publishers 1996); POPULATION MIGRATION AND
THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER at 115-125 (W.T.S. Gould & A.M. Findlay, eds., John
Wiley & Sons 1994).
35. See infra note 49, regarding the large number of immigrants to the United
States from countries where it has intervened.
36. On the impact and distorting influence of colonialism and globalization on the
normal development of underdeveloped countries, see generally FERNANDO ENRIQUE
CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
(University of California Press 1979); Andre Gunder Frank, CAPITALISM AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Monthly Review Press 1967); Edward
Goldsmith, Development as Colonialism, printed in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL
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Consequently, egalitarian principles would seem to require
that the richer nations rectify past injustices, and that they
refrain from immigration practices and other actions likely to
increase the inequalities among nations and to induce people to
emigrate from underdeveloped countries where they would other-
wise choose to remain and contribute. Until that happens, some
restraints on emigration from those underdeveloped countries
might benefit the least advantaged in the world and might be nec-
essary to counteract the distortions of the past and present injus-
tices that influence a person's decision to stay or leave.3" As with
utilitarianism, then, international norms overly protect the right
to emigrate and under protect the right to immigrate relative to
liberal egalitarian principles.
Similar problems plague libertarian approaches such as
Nozick's 8 The starting point for a libertarian analysis is people's
freedom to choose with whom to associate. At first blush, this
might seem to comport with the prevailing international standard
of free emigration and controlled immigration, in that the right
not to associate supports people's right to leave an association of
which they no longer wish to be a member as well as people's right
to deny admission to someone they do not want as a member of
their association. But the matter is more complex than that.
The right to freely leave works best when people have volun-
tarily entered an association with the understanding that all have
ECONOMY at 253 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., Sierra Club Books 1996);
WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (Howard University Press
1981).
37. However, the extent to which restraints on emigration in the interest of
protecting a country's economic well-being are permissible under current
international norms is questionable. During the struggle for international
recognition of the right to leave, only the former Soviet bloc and other Communist
countries strongly asserted nations' sovereign right to impose restraints on
emigration for such reasons. DowwY, supra note 15, at 113, 152-53. However, the far
more restrictive view supported by the West, which at best allows for restrictions only
upon a strong showing of justification and requires that any restrictions be very
narrowly drawn, has prevailed. See HANNUM, supra note 9, at 37 (quoting the opinion
of Jos6 Ingl6s, a well-known jurist who authored a United Nations' commissioned
study that strongly supports the right to leave and that contributed greatly to the
international recognition of the right, that "some restrictions on movement may, in
narrow circumstances, be justified in order to prevent serious and demonstrable
'brain drain' in developing countries"); Jagerskiold, supra note 13, at 178-79 (arguing
that restrictions to prevent brain drain are "probably not permissible" and that
prohibiting all emigration due to labor shortage would be "totally contrary to the
Covenant").
38. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books 1974). For several
articles on the libertarian approach to freedom of movement, see Immigration
Symposium, 13(2) J. OF LiBERTARIAN STUD. (1998).
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the right to opt out when they so choose. But if people have the
right to agree on the freedom to opt out, they should also be free to
agree that an association, once formed, may not be unilaterally
severed. For example, the reliance and opportunity costs of enter-
ing into a particular association could be so great that people
might be unwilling to proceed without a guaranty of non-sever-
ability. Even absent an express agreement, such factors may at
times make it appropriate to imply that people may not unilater-
ally terminate an association."9
This analogy is imperfect in the nation-state context because
most people do not freely enter but are born into their societies.
However, even here, a society might plausibly contend, on the
39. It might be illuminating in this regard to compare the freedom to leave one's
country with other instances of unilateral termination of relationships. One is
divorce. Currently in the United States the right of one party to a marriage to
unilaterally end it is widely regarded as an important individual prerogative.
However, for much of U.S. history, the grounds for divorce were quite narrow, thereby
making it more difficult to divorce without a mutual agreement between the parties.
Moreover, the law today often imposes waiting periods and substantial financial and
other obligations on individuals seeking unilateral divorce. Not only are reliance and
opportunity cost factors as between the parties to a marriage at stake here, but also
the interest of society as a whole in promoting social stability - the very factors that
underlie the issue of regulating the freedom to leave one's country. A second
comparison is secession. The issue of the South's right to unilaterally secede led to
the U.S. Civil War; and it is still unclear whether a state has that right under the
Constitution, although most commentators conclude not. See MARK E. BRANDON,
FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 167-99
(Princeton University Press 1998) (discussing circumstances under which secession
might be justified); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1451-62 (1987). Amar states that "the plain import of [the Constitution]... is
flatly inconsistent with the states' rights theory of popular sovereignty that underlies
the claimed right of secession." Id. at n.162. In the international context the split-up
of the Soviet Union and the independence movement in Quebec have generated recent
scholarly commentary from a variety of perspectives, although again the prevailing
view seems to be that there is no general moral or legal right to secede. See Lea
Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J.
INr'L L. 177 (1991) (arguing for right to secede when territory illegally annexed but
not on grounds of nationality or group cohesiveness alone); Alan Buchanan,
Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 53 (1995)
(arguing for right to secede of groups suffering severe injustices at the hands of the
state but otherwise no general right to secede); Robert W. McGee, The Theory of
Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L.
451 (1992) (arguing for a right to secede); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and
Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1991) (identifying moral arguments supporting
secession but opposing an explicit constitutional right to secede as overly
destabilizing). And again the same factors are at play as in the divorce and freedom
to leave contexts. These comparisons show that the freedom to leave one's country,
while certainly implicating important individual rights concerns, also implicates
important concerns of others affected thereby and of society as a whole, such that
treating it as a substantially unlimited unilateral right seems overbroad.
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basis of willing acceptance or on social contract grounds, that the
benefits the society has conferred on people justify restraining
their withdrawal, at least until they have somehow compensated
the society for the benefits received.40
The right to exclude others from an association also has its
problems. Under libertarianism people may not exercise their
freedoms so as to undermine the freedom of others.4 In the asso-
ciational context this poses an irreconcilable clash of liberty inter-
ests when one party wants an association that another does not.
To recognize the right to impose an association interferes with the
liberty of the party who does not want it, whereas to recognize the
right to refuse an association impedes the liberty of the party who
wants it. Libertarianism cannot resolve this clash in the abstract,
since whichever move is made privileges the liberty interest of one
party over the other. Consequently, conferring on a nation the
unfettered discretion to control immigration cannot be reconciled
with libertarian principles, since it overly favors the liberty inter-
ests of insiders as against outsiders.
Libertarianism requires a more balanced approach that
examines the liberty interests at stake in context. If someone has
a number of roughly comparable associations to choose from, that
one rejects the person may not warrant overriding the associa-
tion's liberty interest. However, were all to ostracize the person,
then the person's interest in having some association to belong to
might be paramount; as, for example, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights' requirement that everyone has a right to a
nationality."
40. Only a few countries currently impose such restrictions. Cuba, for example,
requires three to five years of service for recently graduated professionals (especially
doctors) in order to obtain an exit permit. See U.S. Dep't. of State, 1999 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices. (on file with author). Unfortunately, countries
that restrain emigration and travel often do so for political reasons that seem clearly
impermissible under international norms. The United States too has frequently tried
to restrict travel for political reasons. Some of these restrictions have been
overthrown as violating the right to travel while others have been upheld on national
security or foreign policy grounds. See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
(overthrowing Subversive Activities Control Act provision making it a felony for
member of Communist organization to apply for, use or attempt to use a passport);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding refusal to validate passports for travel to
Cuba); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding revocation of passport for
activities abroad determined to cause damage to national security and foreign policy);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding restrictions on travel to Cuba).
41. As succinctly put by Nozick, supra note 38, at ix: "Individuals have rights, and
there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."
See also id. at 10-12, 33-35.
42. UDHR, supra note 7, at art. 15.
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In the international context a country with ample resources
would seem to have a weaker claim to reject immigrants, particu-
larly if the immigrants lack viable opportunities elsewhere, than
an impoverished one that would have difficulty supporting new-
comers. It would certainly violate libertarian principles for a
group of people to appropriate for themselves a lion's share of the
available resources, to form a nation-state to protect those
resources, and then to deny entry to others on grounds of freedom
of association.4" Consequently, since the United States does con-
trol a disproportionate share of the world's resources, it might
strongly be argued that libertarian principles require the United
States to allow substantial immigration and even more so than at
present given the hardships facing people elsewhere.
To sum up, so far the analysis suggests that it is hard to rec-
oncile with any of the major ideological underpinnings of liber-
alism the favored treatment international law accords the
freedom to emigrate over the right to immigrate, the preferred
status it accords the freedom to emigrate, and the substantially
unfettered discretion it accords nations to control immigration. It
is difficult to say precisely what approach would satisfy liberal
ideals, although it does seem fair to say that all would require
substantial, though not unrestricted, freedom of movement in
both the emigration and immigration contexts, subject however to
a balancing process that would also give substantial weight to the
interests of others affected thereby and of society as a whole.
IV. AN HISTORICAL-MATERIALIST ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
Given the disconnect between liberal ideology and interna-
tional practice, I want now to turn to a historical-materialist anal-
ysis as a way to help explain the practice. This entails examining
international standards regarding emigration and immigration
43. See NozIcK, supra note 38, at 174-82. Under Nozick's libertarianism
individuals and groups acting in concert have the right to appropriate goods from the
commons, i.e., previously unowned goods, subject to a principle ofjust acquisition that
requires that they do not thereby worsen the position of others or that they
compensate others. There are nice questions about what constitutes a worsening of
others' positions or adequate compensation: Did the United States violate the rights
of Native Americans by seizing previously owned property? Did Native Americans
have an obligation to share the territory with others despite their prior appropriation
of it? Has the position of Native Americans been worsened by the settlement of the
country and has the United States adequately compensated them for the resulting
harms? Is the United States today, through its immigration policies and other
practices, violating the principle of just acquisition?
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not in the abstract as liberal ideology tends to do, but in the real-
world context of an increasingly globalized world economy domi-
nated by the richer capitalist nations, and especially by the
United States. In this context, the right of people to freely emi-
grate coupled with the sovereign right of nations to control immi-
gration favors the richer capitalist nations and disadvantages the
poorer and less developed ones.
In a world as at present of great inequality, people have an
incentive to move from areas of lesser to areas of greater opportu-
nity in order to better their own and their families' circum-
stances." At times, emigration may benefit poorer nations by
easing the burden of maintaining a population for whom there is
not enough to go around. But emigration may also hurt poorer
nations by draining off people who are needed to develop their
societies. In that situation one would expect to find nations
attempting to prevent emigration, as in fact some do.45
Successfully preventing emigration can be problematic, how-
ever. If not allowed to leave, people who want out may be a dis-
ruptive influence impeding a country's stability and development.
Moreover, people are frequently able to find ways to leave despite
legal obstacles, whereas poorer countries may be hard-pressed to
afford preventive measures.
46
44. For discussions of the factors likely to enter into people's decisions whether to
migrate, see THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: The American Experience
21-135 (Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz & Josh DeWind eds., Russell Sage
Foundation 1999); Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, 3 DEMOGRAPHY 47 (1966).
45. Restraints on emigration are of several types. Rarely do countries impose
wholesale bans, perhaps in response to the international norm favoring free
emigration. A primary control measure has been to deny (often for discretionary
reasons) or to delay (often for years) the issuance of a passport or other governmental
approval required to leave. Other measures include charging fees beyond people's
means, prohibiting departees from taking assets with them, and requiring an
agreement to return or to perform public service. See DowTy, supra note 15, at 63-85,
113-26; HANNuM, supra note 9, at 71-117. On the world-wide use of the passport
system developed during and after World War I as the main method nations employ
to prevent people from leaving, see Lesley Higgins & Marie-Christine Leps,
Rethinking the Exercise of Power: The Case of The Passport v. Mobility Rights, 11(4)
RETHINKING MARXISM, 113 (Winter 1999); JoHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE
PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE STATE 111-57 (Cambridge University
Press 2000).
46. See generally Dowry, supra note 15, at 154-57; THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 34, at 34 (noting that "(b)y and
large, developing countries have been unable, and largely unwilling, to prevent the
emigration of their professional and skilled workers to developed countries on a
permanent basis"). The difficulty countries have in preventing emigration is well
illustrated by the millions of undocumented immigrants crossing the border between
Mexico and the United States, see infra note 65 and accompanying text; as well as by
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And when richer countries want to encourage emigration for
their own advantage, there are ways to do so. That the poorer
nations are tied to a global economy and in need of money to
finance development enables the richer nations to encourage per-
missive emigration through strings attached to trade and aid,47
and to ignore efforts of developing nations to negotiate solutions to
the brain drain problem.48 Military and political intervention can
and has induced many people to leave, as with U.S. intervention
in Central America and Southeast Asia.4" And being part of an
increasingly interdependent world order with an international
norm favoring the right to emigrate is a further inducement to
allow people to leave.
Certainly the United States, which has less than five percent
of the world's population, but almost twenty percent of the
migrant population, has wanted to encourage permissive emigra-
tion.5" Throughout U.S. history, emigrants from other countries
the many people who come to the United States as refugees and asylees, more than
900,000 having been so admitted between 1991-1998. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 1998 Statistical Yearbook, Table 4 (on file with author).
47. See DowTy, supra note 15, at 210-21, 232-34 (noting the use of international
pressure and trade and aid negotiations as inducing countries to liberalize
emigration, and citing in particular the success of the United States in threatening to
withhold trade privileges from nations restricting free emigration pursuant to the
Trade Reform Act of 1974).
48. See J. d'Oliviera e Sousa, The Brain Drain Issue in International Negotiations,
as printed in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
supra note 34, at 197 (discussing the unsuccessful attempts of developing nations
during the 1970s and early 1980s to get various international bodies to address
proposals for compensation for brain drain due to the reservations of the developed
nations benefiting therefrom).
49. Since 1960 more than 750,000 Cubans have come to the United States; since
1970 more than 700,000 Vietnamese have come; between 1981-94 some 330,000 came
from El Salvador as legal immigrants and more than 300,000 came illegally. In
addition, several hundred thousand legal and undocumented immigrants have come
from Nicaragua and Guatemala. In all of these countries, U.S. intervention has
contributed to great internal disruption and hardship. Moreover, the United States
has encouraged and facilitated this movement through laws according immigrants
from these countries favorable treatment. See Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 1998 Statistical Yearbook, Tables 2 & 3; I.N.S., 1997 Statistical Yearbook,
Appendix 1; I.N.S., Illegal Alien Resident Population. (All on file with author).
50. PHILIP MARTIN & JONAS WIDGREN, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE (1996) (a publication of the Population Reference Bureau) (on file with
The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review). As of the mid-1990's the
world's migrant population totaled about 125 million people, of whom 23 million were
in the United States. Other capitalist nations, as well, have benefited from
permissive emigration. Seven of the world's richest countries (the United States,
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and Canada), with less than one-
eighth of the world's population, had about one-third of the migrant population. The
developed nations as a whole had about 46% of the total migrant population. On the
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have been a major source of the people needed to settle its
expanding territory and develop its economy. Without immigra-
tion the United States would not be the great capitalist empire it
has become. And immigration is still an important factor in the
maintenance of U.S. hegemony.
The past two decades have seen the largest number of immi-
grants for any comparable period in U.S. history, with more than
sixteen million legal and some five to six million undocumented
immigrants.5' And this trend is expected to continue with a pro-
jected increase in the population of the United States of more than
100 million people over the next half-century, two-thirds of the
increase being attributable to immigration. 2
For there to be immigrants for the United States to receive,
people must be able to emigrate from elsewhere. The interna-
tional standard of permissive emigration, along with the other
incentives discussed above, help produce the needed flow. But not
all comers are wanted, only those who serve U.S. interests. Thus
the need for an international regime that recognizes the sovereign
right to control immigration, without which the number of immi-
grants to the United States would be far greater and their socio-
economic characteristics far different than at present.
Substantial numbers of immigrants have come to the United
States throughout its history.53 The United States had an essen-
tially open-door policy, accepting all comers, until the late 1800's
when the Chinese Exclusion Laws and laws prohibiting the entry
receptivity of the United States and other developed nations to immigration, see also
supra note 34. See generally STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF
MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD
(Macmillan Press 1998 2d. ed.); CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION - A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, & James F. Hollifield, eds., Stanford
University Press 1994).
51. See generally Immigration and Naturalization Service's Statistical Yearbooks,
supra note 49; Michael Fix & Jeffrey Passel, Immigration and Immigrants, Setting
the Record Straight 19-27 (May 1994), a publication of The Urban Institute available
at http://www.urban.org/pubs/ immiglimmig.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
52. Fix & Passel, supra note 51, at 38-40; Immigration Comes Alive in Newest U.S.
Population Projections, POPULATION TODAY: FEBRUARY/MARCH 2000, a publication of
the Population Reference Bureau available at http://www.prb.org/Contentl
NavigationMenu/PT articles/January-March_2000/
Immigration-ComesAlive inNewestU.S.PopulationProjections.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2002).
53. On the history of U.S. immigration law and practice, see Fix & Passel, supra
note 51, at 9-16; CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, §§. 2.02-2.04 (1996); U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR, 7-19 (Sept. 1980)(on file with author).
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of so-called undesirable immigrants were enacted. 4 From the
1840's through the 1920's, a great wave of immigration brought
some 37 million people to the country, mostly from northern and
western Europe until the end of the century and thereafter largely
from southern and central Europe.5 These immigrants, moved to
go to the United States by poverty and upheaval at home and the
hope of a better life abroad, helped settle the country and provided
much of the labor force needed for the U.S.'s rapidly industrializ-
ing economy. 6
In the 1920's, having consolidated its territory and estab-
lished itself as a world power, the United States began to limit the
number of immigrants, and adopted a highly ethnocentric
national origin quota system greatly favoring Europeans and
among Europeans the most numerous nationalities already in the
country. These limitations, along with the Great Depression and
World War II, reduced immigration to a relative trickle during the
1930's through the 1950's. The quota system was abolished in
1965 and a more permissive and less ethnocentric system
adopted.
8
54. Meanwhile, the United States in its early years had an ambivalent attitude
toward emigration. On the one hand, there was an impetus to champion free
movement in response to European restraints on emigration that might impede the
population of the rapidly expanding country. This led Congress to declare in 1868
that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people." Dowry,
supra note 15, at 49. On the other hand, due to the country's great need for people
there was a reluctance to recognize the right of U.S. citizens to change their
citizenship, which did not happen until the early 1900's. However, the interests of
Europe and the United States converged during the 19 th century as liberalized
emigration practices helped European countries with domestic problems, while the
great influx of Europeans to the United States, facilitated by unrestricted
immigration, enabled it to grow and reduced the need to discourage emigration. As a
result, there was substantially free movement between Europe and the United States
over the second half of the 19' century. Additionally, in much of the rest of the world,
movement was relatively free or subjected to decreasing restraint. This interlude was
brief, however, as the first half of the 2 0
th century saw a resurgence of restraints on
both immigration and emigration, followed by the movement for the international
recognition of a fundamental right to leave, resulting today in substantially
unrestrained freedom to emigrate throughout much of the world. On these points, see
DowTy, supra note 15, at 42-94; HANNUM, supra note 9, at 71-117.
55. See Fix & Passel, supra note 51, at 19-20.
56. See PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE
AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER 253-55 (Monthly Review Press 1966).
57. The Tarnished Golden Door, supra note 53, at 9-10.
58. The system is still arguably racist, however. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration
Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How. L.J. 237, 237-44, 253-
61 (1994) (arguing immigration laws disfavor Africans because their primary
emphasis is on family reunification, which favors those already in the country; and
per increased emphasis on skills, relatively low number of refugee visas, and
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Since that time immigration has increased sharply, and as
noted above the United States is in the midst of the greatest wave
of immigration in its history. 9 Most of the newcomers have been
non-European. As late as the 1950's, more than half of legal
immigrants were from Europe. By the 1980's and 1990's, about
80% of legal immigrants were from Latin America and Asia.
6 0
Including the great expansion of illegal immigration, mostly from
Central America, that began in the mid-1960's as a consequence of
ceilings imposed for the first time on immigration from the West-
ern Hemisphere, some 85% of all immigrants came from these
areas.
Due to the relatively high quality of life at home, Europeans
have not wanted to come to the United States in sufficient num-
bers to fulfill the need for the continued growth of the U.S. popula-
tion and economy. Relative to Latin America and Asia, however,
the United States' standard of living is significantly higher and
has become increasingly so over the past thirty years.6 1  The
globalization of the world economy, its domination by the
advanced capitalist nations, and an increasing wealth disparity
between richer and poorer nations have all contributed to the
impetus of Latinos and Asians to come to the United States and to
difficulty of qualifying for nonimmigrant visas); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the
Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" Into the Heart of
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) (discussing continuing racism per impact of 20,000
per country limit which hurts countries with large numbers of ethnic minorities,
motivation underlying Refugee Act of 1980 to limit number of Vietnamese refugees,
disproportionate impact on minorities of exclusion of persons likely to become public
charges, the diversity program which favors nations populated largely by whites, an
asylum policy favoring Cubans over Haitians, and the war against undocumented
immigrants which is directed mainly against Mexicans); Jan C. Ting, "Other Than a
Chinaman: How U.S. Immigration Policy Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of
Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 301
(1995) (discussing continuing anti-Asian bias through per country limits, the diversity
program, and the selective enforcement of the refugee laws). But see Gabriel J. Chin,
The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1996) (purpose of 1965
Act to make it easier for Asians to immigrate per racial egalitarian motivation).
59. However, the recent wave of immigrants, though greater in gross numbers
than in any prior comparable time period, represents less of a percentage than earlier
waves of the country's entire population. Between 1870 and 1910, at the height of the
late 19a/early 2 0th century influx, the foreign born population of the United States
approached 15% of the total population. It then declined to about 5% of the total in
1970, and as result of the recent wave of immigrants is now approaching 10% of the
total population. See Fix & Passel, supra note 51, at 20-21.
60. Id. at 25-27.
61. See sources cited supra at note 33.
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the United States' ability to grow and to expand its power as rap-
idly as it has.
However, although less ethnocentric, U.S. immigration policy
has become more classist through controls over the socio-economic
characteristics of the new immigrants that have increasingly
favored highly-skilled people.2 This is reflected in the fact that,
excluding Latin America and refugees, legal immigrants to the
United States from elsewhere, comprising about half of all recent
legal immigrants, tend to be as or better educated than native-
born people."
These controls reflect the changing nature of the global econ-
omy. Accompanying and to a great extent driving globalization
has been the development of high technology, largely dominated
by the United States." This has increased the need for skilled
workers. United States immigration policy has thus enhanced its
competitive position in the world economy by draining better edu-
cated people from underdeveloped nations, thereby avoiding the
cost of training more of its own people and making it more difficult
for the poorer nations to develop and compete.
It is still necessary to account for the large number of immi-
grants who don't fit this class profile. More than half of all immi-
grants, both legal and undocumented, during the 1980's and
1990's came from Latin America, and about half of these were
from Mexico." These immigrants, especially the undocumented
ones, were far less well educated than native-born people.6" Here
a contributing factor is the continuing need for low-wage workers
in segments of the U.S. economy such as farming and domestic
62. See Hing, supra note 58, at 35-45. Likewise, immigration practices in other
developed countries have increasingly favored skilled people. See THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 34, at 22-23; Chen
Chin Long, supra note 34.
63. On the educational level of immigrants as compared with native-born people,
see Julian R. Betts & Magnus Lofstrom, The Educational Attainment of Immigrants:
Trends and Implications 3-15 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
6757, Oct. 1998); Fix & Passel, supra note 51, at 30-34; Guillermina Jasso, Mark R.
Rosenzweig & James P. Smith, The Changing Skills of New Immigrants to the United
States: Recent Trends and their Determinants (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 6764, Oct. 1998) (on file with author).
64. See generally Human Development Report 1999, supra note 29, at 57-76;
Fredrick Jameson, Globalization and Political Strategy, 4 NEW LEFT REVIEW 49 (July/
August 2000); Leo Panitch, The New Imperial State, 2 NEw LEFT REVIEW 5 (March/
April 2000).
65. See Fix & Passel, supra note 51, at 25-26; Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 1998 Statistical Yearbook, Tables 1 & 2; I.N.S., 1997 Statistical Yearbook
199-200.
66. See sources cited supra at note 63.
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service. Another factor is that the ability of impoverished Latinos
to enter the United States, support themselves here, and send
money to families at home helps quell potential social upheaval in
those countries.
Maintaining its economic domination of Latin America, and
preventing the spread of socialism and communism there, was a
prime concern of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II
period until the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's. 7 At
times this led the United States to support repressive dictator-
ships, and at times to promote social upheaval against leftist
regimes. These practices induced people to flee to the United
States, as legal refugees in the case of countries such as Cuba and
Nicaragua where the United States sought to topple disfavored
regimes and as undocumented immigrants the United States was
unwilling to admit as refugees in the case of friendly repressive
regimes such as El Salvador and Guatemala.
Currently, the United States promotes forms of democratic
capitalism as a stabilizing mechanism and a means of promoting
its economic interests in Latin America.s" Yet the great amount of
poverty in those countries and the widening disparity in their
standards of living relative to the United States still threaten
upheaval and induce people to leave. Mexico, whose standard of
living has stagnated in recent years69 and where social upheaval
67. See generally Thomas Carothers, The Reagan Years: The 1980s, printed in
EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA at 90 (Abraham F.
Lowenthal, ed., Johns Hopkins University Press 1991); Jorge I. Dominguez, US-Latin
American Relations During the Cold War and Its Aftermath, printed in THE UNITED
STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: THE NEW AGENDA at 33 (Victor Balmer-Thomas & James
Dunkerley, eds., Harvard University Press 1999); Lester D. Langley, AMERICA AND
THE AMERICAS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 161-227, 237-50
(The University of Georgia Press 1989); Tony Smith, The Alliance for Progress: The
1960s, printed in EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA at
71.
68. See generally EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA,
supra note 67; MICHAEL J. KRYZANEK, U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 103-17, 207-
65 (Praeger 1996); James Petras, Global Transformations and the Future of Socialism
in Latin America, 18/19 NEw POLITICAL SCIENCE 181, 188-91 (Fall/Winter 1990).
69. Between 1980 and 1998 Mexico's per capita GDP rose less than 10% in real
dollars. During this same period the GDP of the United States, which in 1980 was
already about five times greater than Mexico's, rose by almost 40% and by 1998 was
almost seven times greater than Mexico's. See Human Development Indicators, Table
7, in Human Development Report 2000, a publication of the U.N. Dev. Prog. available
at http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/english/HDR2000.html (last visited Jan. 14 2002).
See also Carlos Heredia & Mary Purcell, Structural Adjustment and the Polarization
of Mexican Society, printed in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLoBAL ECONOMY, supra note
36, at 273 (detailing the increasing income and wealth disparities in Mexico and the
decreasing quality of life of Mexico's poor between the early 1980s and mid-1990s due
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would be particularly threatening due to its proximity to the
United States, is the prime example. Hence, substantial immigra-
tion from Latin America, and especially Mexico, is likely to con-
tinue and to function as a needed safety valve.
But if stability and the need for low-wage workers are factors,
then why doesn't the United States admit more legal immigrants
from Latin America, and why doesn't it provide more foreign aid
to those countries so as to promote stability through economic
development?7 ° Or if it is not necessary to allow immigration for
these reasons, then why doesn't the United States more vigorously
prevent illegal immigration?
Here domestic political considerations may be factors. One is
the practical difficulty and great cost of controlling the borders
and rooting out undocumented immigrants once there.7 Moreo-
ver, there is a risk of alienating voters who view the control mea-
sures as heavy-handed or who sympathize with the plight of
undocumented immigrants. Many eligible voters in the United
States have family members who are undocumented immigrants,
or come from countries that undocumented immigrants have left
for similar reasons.
7 2
to structural economic adjustments and the resulting peso crisis); Economic Survey of
Mexico, July 2000 (report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) available at http:/[wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-book/ 1000401e.pdf
(last visited Jan. 14, 2002) (noting a recent improvement in Mexico's economic
performance and relatively favorable prospects for continued improvement, but also
noting that standards of living have improved only marginally in the past decade).
70. U.S. foreign aid reached its height in 1985, but with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War has declined to less than half of that level in real
dollars. In 1997, U.S. developmental aid was less than 1% of the federal budget, and
the lowest as a percentage of GNP of all member states of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. See Foreign Aid Languishes in an Age of
Indifference, 57 CQ WEEKLY 1627 (July 3, 1999). Historically, the lion's share of U.S.
foreign aid has been for military assistance. Economic assistance has been more
geared to geopolitical than developmental ends, with most of the aid going to a
relatively few countries that have served U.S. strategic interests and with only a
small share benefiting the poorest countries. See Jan Nijman, United States Foreign
Aid Crisis? What Crisis? printed in THE GLOBAL CRISIS IN FOREIGN AID 29 at (Richard
Grant & Jan Nijman eds., Syracuse University Press 1998).
71. On the success or failure of measures to prevent illegal immigration, and the
reasons therefor, see Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a
Dialectical Model of White Collar Crime, 24 LAw AND Soc'Y REV. 1041 (1990); Cecilia
M. Espinoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 343 (1994); Peter H. Schuck, Law and the
Study of Migration, Program for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy,
Working Paper #226, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
=191409 (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
72. U.S. immigration law favors persons closely related to U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents, and such persons constitute the majority of all legal
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Then there is the class aspect. As the globalization of the
economy has brought about widening wealth disparities between
richer and poorer nations, it has also contributed to widening dis-
parities between the well off and the less well off within the
United States and other developed nations.73 Many workers in the
United States feel threatened by the export abroad of jobs and by
the influx of low-wage workers, both of which are perceived to and
may actually drive down wages for some lower-skilled native-born
people, even as they benefit the economy generally.1
4
In the long run it may be that globalization will produce
greater solidarity among workers world-wide as they come to rec-
ognize that capitalism only allows a limited amount of the wealth
immigrants. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998 Statistical Yearbook 13-
18, Table 4 (on file with author).
73. Regarding the United States, see Bureau of the Census, Income Inequality
Tables, available at http:/www.census.gov/hhes/income/ histinc/ie4.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002); BACK TO SHARED PROSPERITY: THE GROWING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH
AND INCOME IN AMERICA (Ray Marshall ed., M.E. Sharpe 2000); ISAAC SHAPIRO &
ROBERT GREENSTEIN, THE WIDENING INCOME GULF (1999), a (publication of the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities) available at http://www.cbpp.orgl9-4-99tax-rep.htm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2002); DANIEL H. WEINBERG, A BRIEF LOOK AT PosTwAR U.S.
INCOME INEQUALITY (June 1996), a publication of the Bureau of the Census, available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/img/p60-191.pdf (last visited Jan 14, 2002). As of
1995 the wealthiest one percent of U.S. households owned thirty-nine percent of the
nation's wealth, and the top twenty percent owned eighty-four percent. Wealth and
income disparities have steadily increased over the past generation. Wealth and
income in the United States are more concentrated at the top now than at any time
since the Great Depression. Regarding the increasing wealth disparities within other
developed nations, see U.N. Dev. Prog., Human Development Report 1998 (on file with
author).
74. The economic impact of immigration is highly complicated and debated. Fix &
Passel, supra note 51, at 34-39, 47-72, conclude that immigrant incomes are roughly
proportional to their share of the population and higher than the incomes of native-
born people for long-term immigrants; that there is no aggregate effect on the labor
market, with small negative effects on low-skilled workers in stagnant economies
with high concentrations of immigrants but with immigration increasing
opportunities for low-skilled workers in growing economies; and that immigrants pay
more in taxes than the cost of governmental services received and except for refugees
receive public assistance at significantly lower rates than native-born people.
However, Passel & Clark conclude that undocumented immigrants generate a net
deficit re taxes paid versus services received. Jeffrey S. Passel & Rebecca L. Clark,
How Much Do Immigrants Really Cost? (The Urban Institute Feb. 1994)(on file with
author). For another study reaching generally positive conclusions, see JULIAN L.
SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (University of Michigan Press
1999, 2d ed.). For studies reaching generally negative conclusions, see GEORGE J.
BoRJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY
79-196 (Basic Books 1990); Donald Huddle, The Costs of Immigration (Carrying
Capacity Network 1996)(on file with author). For a study reaching mixed conclusions,
see The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration
173-296 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston, eds., National Academy Press 1977).
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they create to trickle down to them. And they may conclude that
their interests would be better served by banding together to
change the system, instead of fighting amongst themselves over a
piece of a pie not big enough to provide a decent life for all because
so much is appropriated by the ruling elite. In the short run it
may be harder to see this, thereby giving rise to nativist and pro-
tectionist sentiments that the ruling elite has an incentive to
exploit so as to impede the development of worker solidarity.
This helps to explain the largely unsuccessful recent efforts to
block free-trade agreements,75 and the somewhat more successful
effort to enact laws depriving both legal and undocumented immi-
grants of the benefits available to native-born people."6 In the
main, the capitalist class as a whole can be expected to and has
successfully thwarted opposition to free trade, which is so essen-
tial to a global economy. However, there is less reason to thwart
legal distinctions between native-born people and immigrants,
which can serve the interests of the ruling elite by helping to
divide the working class and to induce immigrants to assimilate
more rapidly into the society. Meanwhile, undocumented immi-
grants can be made scapegoats, further dividing the working
class, through laws purporting to crack down on illegal immigra-
tion, while the less visible process of a pretended though less than
vigorous enforcement allows millions to enter the country as low-
wage workers or for safety-valve purposes.
V. THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT UNDER SOCIALISM
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to show
through a historical-materialist analysis that international stan-
dards and practices regarding emigration and immigration do not
comport with the liberal ideology that underlies international law,
75. See David Bacon, Globalization: Two Faces, Both Ugly, DOLLARS AND SENSE 18
(Mar. 1, 2000) (detailing labor concerns about and opposition to free trade); JOHN R.
MAcARTHUR, THE SELLING OF "FREE TRADE": NAFTA, WASHINGTON, AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Hill and Wang 2000) (detailing the intense
lobbying efforts in support of NAFTA by the White House and business interests).
76. For a history and analysis of these efforts, see Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions
on Non-Citizens'Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42
UCLA L.REv. 1475 (1995). Most recently, The Public Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 barred undocumented immigrants from most
public benefits at all levels of government and barred or limited the access of legal
immigrants to means-tested public assistance such as food stamps and Supplemental
Social Security ("SSI"). Some of the limitations applicable to legal immigrants have
since been softened or repealed. I.N.S., 1997 Statistical Yearbook, Appendix 1 (on file
with author).
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but rather serve the interests of the capitalist class which domi-
nates the global economy. Now I would like to consider briefly
how freedom of movement might be handled under democratic
socialism."
Since there has been little if any experience with democratic
socialism on a national level,7" and certainly nothing approaching
a democratic-socialist world community, these thoughts are neces-
sarily speculative and idealistic. The question is what might be
possible under democratic socialism, recognizing that as practiced
it will no doubt fall short of its ideals and require a historical-
materialist analysis to understand the practice.
Capitalist domination of the world economy has been accom-
panied and made possible by the decline of actually existing
socialism, caused in part perhaps by the power of capital and in
77. By democratic socialism, I mean a society in which decision-making about the
production and distribution of all the goods of social life is ultimately socialized and
democratized, i.e., subject to public control pursuant to processes in which everyone
has the opportunity to participate on relatively equal terms. This does not necessarily
require the abolition of all private spheres of social life, including even private
property and markets. But it does require that society be structured so as to
equitably meet the needs of everyone, and accordingly that the public and private
spheres of social life be subordinate to that end. This, in turn, requires a relatively
equal distribution of the goods of social life, without which the needs of all would not
be equitably met and participation in decision-making regarding the production and
distribution of those goods could not be on equal terms. See THOMAS KLEVEN, Private
Property and Democratic Socialism, XXI THE LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 1 (1997). For
other discussions of democratic socialism, see generally SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT
GINTis, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS
OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT (Basic Books 1987); NORBERTO BOBBIG, WHICH
SOCIALISM?: MARXISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (Roger Griffin, trans., Richard
Bellamy, ed., University of Minnesota Press 1987); TOM BOTTOMORE, THE SOCIALIST
ECONOMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Guilford Press 1990); FRANK CUNNINGHAM,
DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND SOCIALISM (Cambridge University Press 1987); CAROL
GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY (Cambridge University Press 1988); Ralph Miliband,
The Plausibility of Socialism, 206 NEW LEFT REV. 3 (1994); MARKET SOCIALISM: THE
CURRENT DEBATE (John E. Roemer & Parnab K. Bardhan, eds., Oxford University
Press 1993).
78. Perhaps the now defunct or at least declining social democracies in some
Western European countries are the closest examples, although the prevalence there
of the capitalist mode of production makes them more capitalist than socialist and has
contributed to their inability to sustain the welfare-state measures that represent
their more socialistic aspects. See Andrew Glen, Social Democracy and Full
Employment, 211 NEW LEFT REV. 33 (1995); Rianne Mahon & Rudolph Meidner,
"System-Shift", or What is the Future of Swedish Social Democracy? 23(4) SOCIALIST
REV. 57 (1994); Jonathan W. Moses, Abdication from National Policy Autonomy:
What's Left to Leave? 22(2) POL. AND SOC'Y 125 (1994); Ton Notermans, Social
Democracy in Open Economies: A Reply to Jonathan Moses, 22(2) POL. AND SoC'Y 149
(1994). See generally ADAM PlzEwoEsKi, CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
(Cambridge University Press 1985).
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part perhaps by the failure of the socialist regimes to democra-
tize.79 If, however, the inequalities of the new world order should
persist or deepen, or if some economic crisis or other catastrophe
should strike, it is conceivable that a revitalized and more demo-
cratic socialism might emerge. 0 Perhaps capitalism must domi-
nate the entire world and expend itself before a transition will be
possible from capitalism and the nation-state system that sup-
ports it to a worldwide democratic socialism. 1
Such a process, if it ever occurs, will likely not happen over-
night, however, and in the transition socialist societies would have
to contend with the continued existence of powerful capitalist
nations. Like capitalist societies, socialist societies too might need
people in order to develop and to defend themselves as well. And,
since socialism strives to reduce the inequalities resulting from
the distinction between manual and mental labor,82 they might be
especially vulnerable to having their more highly skilled people
drained off by the richer capitalist nations. So some socialist soci-
eties might well encourage immigration and discourage
emigration.
On the other hand, socialist societies would not necessarily
79. On the reasons for the collapse of actually existing socialism, see Michael
Burawoy, Marxism Is Dead, Long Live Marxism! 20(2) SOCIALIST REV. 7 (1990); Hans
Heinz Holt, The Downfall and Future of Socialism, 5(3) NATURE, SOC'Y, & THOUGT
17, 101-18 (1992); Ralph Miliband, Reflections on the Crisis of Communist Regimes,
177 NEW LEFT REV. 27 (1989).
80. See generally DANIEL SINGER, WHOSE MILLENNIUM? THEIRS OR OURS? (Monthly
Review Press 1999).
81. Marx believed that socialism would come about only after capitalism advanced
society's productive forces to a level of being able to create abundance and would occur
first in the advanced capitalist societies as a result of the immiseration of the working
class. See G.A. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENSE 197-215
(Princeton University Press 1978); JOHN ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARx 295-98,
303-09 (Cambridge University Press 1985). Although Marx seems to have thought
the changeover from capitalism to socialism was imminent, perhaps capitalism's
ability to continue its expansion first through colonialism, see generally V.I. LENIN,
IMPERIALISM - THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (International Publishers 1939),
and now through its economic domination of the New World Order, has enabled it to
sustain itself and grow even more powerful. However, as the absence of potential new
markets and environmental constraints limit capitalism's ability to continue
expanding, perhaps its internal contradictions, and in particular its inability to meet
the needs of all, will finally lead to its downfall. See William Pencak, Socialism: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come? 5(1) NATURE, SOC'Y, & THOUGHT 97 (1992).
82. See, e.g., HARRY BRAVERMAN, LAROR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE
DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 124-37, 315-26 (Monthly Review
Press 1974) (discussing the increasing concentration under capitalism of mental labor
in the hands of a relative few and the dehumanizing impact of the division of labor on
those relegated to manual labor).
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open their borders to all comers, since they might have to contend
with issues of resource availability and the capacity to increase
the provision of goods and services for the newcomers. In fact,
since planning is central to socialism, one would expect to find
substantial regulation of people's freedom to move from one coun-
try to another as well as within countries.
Even a totally socialized world society without national bor-
ders would likely manage people's movement, sometimes prevent-
ing or discouraging it and other times promoting and facilitating it
as social and economic conditions warrant. All of which happens
in various ways under capitalism as well.83 However, the driving
force behind the management of growth and movement would dif-
fer under anything worthy of being called socialism, with the wel-
fare of people rather than profit being the prime value and with
decisions being made more democratically than is possible under
capitalism due to the political imbalance resulting from great
wealth disparity.
Under socialism, helping the less-well-off and equalizing peo-
ple's quality of life throughout the world would be a major consid-
eration underlying emigration and immigration policy. Indeed, it
is possible under socialism that many more people, most of them
impoverished, would be admitted into the United States than at
present and even aided in their adjustment to life there. It is also
likely under socialism that far more aid would be provided than at
present to underdeveloped parts of the world, geared not to
exploitation and profit but to enhancing people's welfare and
reducing inequality, thereby also reducing people's desire to
emigrate.
83. Although the right to travel is constitutionally protected in the United States,
see, e.g., Edwards, supra note 16, people's ability to move where they want is actually
subject to significant indirect control on the local level. Many suburban communities
effectively prevent lower income people from moving there through growth controls
and exclusionary zoning, thereby relegating the less-well-off to depressed urban areas
with inferior educational and job opportunities, and the Supreme Court and many
states courts and legislatures have declined to intervene. See Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-72
(1990); San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting
class-based equal protection challenge to Texas' public school financing scheme
yielding substantial inequality between richer and poorer districts in revenue raising
capacity and educational expenditures on grounds that wealth is not suspect class
and that fostering local control rationally justifies the scheme); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (rejecting race-based equal
protection challenge to denial of rezoning for low cost housing by suburb of Chicago
with over 64,000 residents of whom only 27 were black absent showing of
discriminatory intent or purpose).
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In the short run under a developing worldwide socialism, due
to the grotesque inequalities at the start, 4 the impetus to immi-
grate to the developed parts of the world might make it difficult to
allow unrestricted freedom of movement. In the longer run, as the
distortion of the choice to stay or leave resulting from inequality
and the need to survive declines, it might be possible to practice
freedom of movement. And it would be desirable to do so, as well,
in furtherance of people's human right to pursue their own desti-
nies, a right that liberalism touts but cannot deliver due to its ties
to capitalism. Because capitalism produces an increasingly ine-
galitarian world, freedom of movement will likely never exist
under it and the impetus to control movement will likely only
increase over time.
Many aspects of liberal idealism are compatible with social-
ism and many aspects of socialism are present in liberal idealism,
in particular their democratic and egalitarian aspects. 5 But liber-
alism's tie to capitalism makes it impossible to achieve egalitarian
ideals because capitalism produces ever-greater inequality. To be
sure, there are many examples of serious inequities in societies
practicing forms of socialism." But socialism's rejection of the
capitalist mode of production at least offers the possibility of a
more egalitarian world. There is irony here. For just as capital-
ism has developed society's productive forces to a level that makes
it possible through the socialization of production to meet the
needs of all people, so liberalism has helped advance the idea of
individual worth and dignity so that socialism can complete that
unfinished project too.
84. See sources cited supra at note 33.
85. See generally JoHN BAKER, ARGUING FOR EQuAITY 6 (Verso 1987) (arguing
that "(a)rguments for equality are. .. prior to decisions about particular social
institutions, such as the choice between capitalism and socialism"); BoBBio, supra
note 77, at 85-102 (University of Minnesota Press 1987) (arguing for the importance
of democracy under socialism); SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND
CAPITALISM 178 (Basic Books 1986) (arguing that "(p)ostliberal democracy may be
considered a synthesis of the Jeffersonian and Marxian visions"); Kleven, supra note
77, at 27-39 (arguing that the differences between capitalism and socialism are
matters of emphasis and degree rather than bright line distinctions).
86. See generally CHEN ERiIN, CHINA: CROSSROADS SOCIALIsM 71-119 (Verso 1984)
(arguing that a new form of exploitation has arisen in China where the bureaucratic
class has in effect appropriated state property as its own); Stephen Resnick &
Stephen Wolff, Between State and Private Capitalism: What Was Soviet "Socialism"?
7(1) RETHINKING MARXISM 9 (1990) (arguing that state officials in the Soviet Union
dominated and exploited the working class).
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM HERE
International law and practice regarding freedom of move-
ment are aspects of the overall movement of history. Several
developments in the post-World War II era seem most significant
here.
First, as exemplified by the end of colonialism and the adop-
tion of the United Nations Charter, is the solidification of the
largely autonomous nation-state with the sovereign right to con-
trol its internal affairs as the major repository of governmental
power." Controlling entry into the country is one such internal
affair, most countries do intensely regulate immigration, and
there are minimal international standards limiting the content of
those regulations. Countries are largely free to act at their discre-
tion regarding immigration.
Second, is the international movement for the recognition and
implementation by the community of nation-states of certain fun-
damental human rights." One of these rights, which after an
intense campaign now has the status of international law and is
in fact practiced by most countries, is the largely unimpeded right
to leave one's country.
Third, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of
socialism as an available alternative, is the globalization of the
world economy and its domination by the richer capitalist
nations. 9 This domination has produced growing inequalities
between those nations and the rest of the world. One among
many factors contributing to the growing inequality, facilitated by
permissive emigration practices and immigration laws increas-
ingly favoring them, is the movement of relatively well-educated
87. As recognized in the United Nations Charter, which is based on the principle
of the "sovereign equality of all its Members," U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1, and states
that among the U.N.'s purposes is "(t)o develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. See generally WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 31-37, 365-66 (Columbia University Press 1964);
JOHN G. STOESSINGER, THE MIGHT OF NATIONS (Random House 1979).
88. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9; HANNum,
supra note 9.
89. See generally PAUL HmST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION
(Polity Press 1999) (discussing the domination of the world economy by the United
States, the European Union and Japan, although preferring to characterize it as more
of an "inter-national" than a "globalized" economy in that the world economy and the
emerging multi-national corporations are still dependent on the support of nation-
states as the dominant force in the international arena). See also sources cited supra
at note 64.
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and highly-skilled people from developing countries to the richer
capitalist nations.
Unfortunately, solutions do not seem easy to come by. The
richer capitalist nations do not seem inclined to change their
immigration practices either to draw off fewer highly-skilled peo-
ple or to admit more impoverished people from developing coun-
tries, nor to aid those countries more in their development. The
developing countries seem unprepared to address the problem,
due perhaps to the practical difficulty of preventing people from
leaving, or to a fear that the consequences of the effort may be
even worse than the problem, or to their lack of bargaining power
in dealing with the developed nations. And due to the developed
nations' domination of the global economy, underdeveloped coun-
tries seem hard-pressed to develop as a way to induce the highly
skilled not to leave or to return. As a result, the world is becoming
increasingly polarized: at the top, a relatively few nations where
most live decently and some in lavishness; and at the bottom, a
large group of nations where hundreds of millions of people live in
abject poverty.
This is a disquieting and ominous trend. Disquieting because
of the unpleasantness of living in a world with so much preventa-
ble misery; and because so contrary to the aspiration, as expressed
in the preamble of the United Nations Charter, of an international
community dedicated to "the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all people." Ominous because if the trend contin-
ues it will likely result in catastrophes, like the AIDS plague or
mass starvation, whose effects may spread worldwide. And
because if the trend continues indefinitely, it may well result in
devastating worldwide conflict.
Perhaps an economic crisis within the richer capitalist
nations, as some think is in the offing, will change the equation:
by creating domestic opposition to and decreasing the demand for
the importation of skilled labor; by enabling people to understand
that a world order in which a few benefit and many suffer is
neither a desirable nor viable state of affairs. The risk is that as
in the past an economic crisis will lead to war as the richer capi-
talist nations resort to force as a means of maintaining their domi-
nance and fight among themselves over the spoils. The task of
those of us who see this as a real possibility is to try to enlighten
others about all the undesirable aspects of the new world order
and the possibility of a better way.
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Although no crisis economic
Nor threat of war atomic
May now confront the nation,
It might make sense to gaze ahead
Before pronouncing socialism dead.
The bear may only be in hibernation."
90. This poem was written by the author in the summer of 2000, prior to the
recent stock market decline and the attack on the World Trade Center.
